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OPINION OF THE COURT
            
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Thomas Root appeals his judgment of conviction for tax
evasion and conspiracy to defraud the United States following
a jury trial.  Although Root challenges the venue of the District
Court and the sufficiency of the evidence as to the conspiracy
count, the principal question of precedential import on appeal is
whether the Government may charge a defendant for evading
the assessment of taxes for multiple years in a single count.
3I.
We review the facts in the light most favorable to the
Government because the jury found Root guilty of both charges.
United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372, 382 (3d Cir. 2005).
A.
A former attorney, Root began working in the mid-1990s
as special projects director at Reading Broadcasting, Inc. (RBI),
an independent television station in Reading, Pennsylvania.
Root worked closely with RBI’s Presidents — Micheal Parker
and Frank McCracken — reviewing contracts, preparing
shareholder correspondence and annual reports, and ensuring the
company’s compliance with Federal Communications
Commission and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
regulations.
Pleased with Root’s work, McCracken rewarded Root
with additional commissions from a new client, Master Media
Enterprises.  The commissions were initially paid through RBI’s
payroll and included in Root’s regular salary payments.  As a
result, taxes on the commissions were withheld and reflected on
Root’s W-2 forms.  Soon thereafter, however, Root wrote to
McCracken requesting that his commissions be paid to KGR
New Perspectives (New Perspectives), a limited liability
company that Root established in Ohio.  Around the same time,
McCracken — who also was receiving commissions from
Master Media sales — requested that his commissions be paid
to his own limited liability company (Framco) which Root had
formed at McCracken’s request.  Between 2001 and 2004, RBI
 New Perspectives was owned 85% by Kathy Root and1
15% by Thomas Root.
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paid New Perspectives $94,077.34 and Framco $509,210.43.
Because Root and McCracken had requested that the
commissions be paid to their respective limited liability
companies, these payments were not reflected on their
respective W-2 forms.
In January 2002, RBI’s bookkeeper, Barbara Williamson,
asked McCracken and Root whether she should issue Form
1099s to New Perspectives and Framco to account for the
commissions paid to those entities.  Both men responded that
they did not know whether 1099s were necessary when
payments were made to limited liability companies, but that they
would look into the matter further.  When Williamson inquired
a second time some weeks later, McCracken told her that she
did not need to issue 1099s to those entities.  As a result, RBI
never notified the IRS of these payments.
At the same time they failed to inform the IRS of the
commissions being paid to New Perspectives, Root and his wife
Kathy cited the New Perspectives income on a loan application
they submitted when refinancing their home mortgage in 2001.
The payments made by RBI to New Perspectives were deposited
equally into Kathy’s personal account and into a New
Perspectives account on which Kathy was the lone signatory. 1
In applying for the loan, the Roots listed as income Thomas
Root’s RBI salary as well as $3,000 of monthly income from
New Perspectives attributable to Kathy Root.  Because the bank
required the couple to produce verification of the listed income,
5Thomas Root asked McCracken to sign a “Commission
Agreement” between RBI and New Perspectives under which
RBI would pay New Perspectives a two percent commission on
monthly revenues that RBI collected from Master Media in
exchange for sales services.  Though Kathy Root signed the
agreement on behalf of New Perspectives, the services were
performed solely by Thomas Root.
In addition to the payments from RBI, Root received
income from two Ohio attorneys, George Ford and Victor
Merullo.  Root performed legal research and writing services for
the attorneys and instructed that they pay him through his sole
proprietorship, Legal Information Services Associates (LISA).
Ford and Merullo paid Root as an independent contractor but
did not withhold taxes or issue 1099s to Root.  From 2001 to
2003, Root earned $58,041.91 from Ford and $19,573.85 from
Merullo.
Finally, Root performed services for Micheal Parker
unrelated to his work at RBI,  including setting up companies in
connection with Parker’s many business ventures.  Parker paid
Root — either directly or through LISA — a “success fee” or
“bonus” for his work and covered his related expenses.  Root
earned $56,000 from Parker in 2001 and 2002.  Parker never
issued Root any 1099s in connection with these payments.
B.
In preparing joint tax returns for himself and his wife for
the tax years 2001, 2002, and 2003, Root failed to disclose the
commissions he received from RBI or the income received from
6Ford, Merullo, and Parker.  Furthermore, New Perspectives did
not file tax returns for those tax years.  Consequently, Root
owed taxes in the following amounts: $11,571 in 2001, $19,619
in 2002, and $6,473 in 2003.  After New Perspectives was
served with a grand jury subpoena in 2004, Root filed amended
returns for 2001, 2002, and 2003, which disclosed the payments
made to New Perspectives in those years.  Root still failed to
disclose the income from Ford, Merullo, or Parker, however.
A grand jury indicted Root on one count of conspiracy to
defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, one
count of tax evasion for the years 2000 to 2003 in violation of
26 U.S.C. § 7201, and seven counts of filing a false return in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).  The conspiracy count alleged
that Root and McCracken agreed to defraud the United States by
hiding portions of Root’s income from the IRS.
Root, who is a resident of Ohio, moved for dismissal of
the tax evasion and false return counts, contending that the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania was an improper venue to bring
those charges.  The Government agreed to dismiss the false
return charges and to limit the tax evasion count to the years
2001 to 2003, acknowledging that the alleged evasive acts
relating to 2000 occurred exclusively in Ohio.  After the
Government made those concessions, the District Court
determined that venue was proper with regard to the remaining
counts and the case proceeded to trial.  The jury convicted Root
of both tax evasion and conspiracy.  Following the verdict, Root
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 182
U.S.C. § 3231 and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
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moved for judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, for a new trial.
The District Court denied both motions. 2
II.
Root first argues that his conviction for tax evasion
should be vacated and dismissed because it alleged multiple
years of evasion in a single count and was therefore duplicitous.
“Duplicity is the improper joining of distinct and separate
offenses in a single count.”  United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d
542, 548 (3d Cir. 1998).  Whether an indictment is duplicitous
is a question of law subject to de novo review.  Id. at 547.  
A.
To determine whether a count is duplicitous, we must
ascertain the allowable unit of prosecution to decide whether the
indictment properly charges a violation of the pertinent statute.
Id. at 548.  To do so, we inquire into Congressional intent by
examining the language of the statute.  Id.
The tax evasion statute provides:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner
to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or
the payment thereof shall . . . be guilty of a felony
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
8more than $100,000 . . . , or imprisoned not more
than 5 years, or both . . . . 
26 U.S.C. § 7201.
Section 7201 is silent regarding whether each tax year
must be charged separately or whether multiple years can be
combined in one count.  That question was considered in United
States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1987), where the
Government charged the defendant with one felony count of tax
evasion that covered twelve tax years.  During the relevant time
period, the defendant had conducted all of his personal and
professional business in cash, avoided the acquisition of
attachable assets, and failed to record receipts and
disbursements.  See id. at 57.  The defendant argued that trying
him for all twelve years in one count was duplicitous.  Id. at 56.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
disagreed, holding that “tax evasion covering several years may
be charged in a single count as a course of conduct . . . where
the underlying basis of the indictment is an allegedly consistent,
long-term pattern of conduct directed at the evasion of taxes for
[those] years.”  Id.  The court held that the defendant’s activities
constituted a continuous course of conduct, and each affirmative
act of evasion was intended to evade payment of all taxes owed
or anticipated at the time.  Id.  The court also observed that
section 7201 does not directly address whether it is possible to
charge a continuing scheme to evade taxes for several years.
Rather, the statute merely makes it a felony for any person to
“willfully attempt[ ] in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by this title or the payment thereof .”  Id. at 57 (quoting
926 U.S.C. § 7201).  This broad language, the court concluded,
supported a finding that a multi-year tax evasion count “may
fairly be read to charge but a single scheme and is therefore not
duplicitous.”  Id.
This Court followed Shorter in United States v. Pollen,
978 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1992), where we upheld the Government’s
charge of four counts of tax evasion, each of which covered the
same seven-year period.  In each count, the Government alleged
a distinct affirmative act: the illegal transfer of hundreds of
thousands of dollars in successive attempts to evade payment of
taxes over seven years.  Id. at 86.  We stated that while “it is
logical . . . to charge attempts to evade the assessment of taxes
for distinct years in separate counts,” id. at 87, “it is also
permissible under section 7201 to charge tax evasion covering
several years in a single count as a ‘course of conduct’ in
circumstances ‘where the underlying basis of the indictment is
an allegedly consistent, long-term pattern of conduct directed at
the evasion of taxes for these years,’” id. at 84 (quoting Shorter,
809 F.2d at 58).  We noted the breadth of the statutory language,
finding that “[t]he plain language of this section . . . evinces the
congressional intent to allow distinct, significant, affirmative
acts of tax evasion to constitute separate section 7201 offenses,”
regardless of whether the evasion was carried out over a single
year or multiple years.  Id. at 86.  Additionally, we stated that
“nothing in section 7201’s legislative history requires us to
conclude that Congress intended to limit this provision’s unit of
prosecution to an individual tax year” and “the scant legislative
history of this provision simply does not address the question of
its allowable unit of prosecution.”  Id. at 86 n.14 (citing H.R.
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REP. NOS. 83-1337 and 83-2543 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4137, 4572; 5280, 5343).
Relying largely on Shorter and Pollen, the District Court
upheld the Government’s inclusion of multiple years of evasion
in a single count, finding that Root’s actions constituted a
“continuous course of conduct.”  Shorter, 809 F.2d at 57.  These
actions included: diverting commission payments from RBI for
the years 2001 to 2003 through New Perspectives without
declaring them as income; funneling his legal research payments
from Ford and Merullo for the years 2001 to 2003 through LISA
without declaring them as income; avoiding the issuance of
1099s to New Perspectives or LISA; and failing to declare as
income any payments from Parker for the years 2001 or 2002.
The court determined that these actions — taken over the course
of three years —  represent the sort of “consistent, long-term
pattern of conduct directed at the evasion of taxes” found in
Shorter and Pollen.
B.
Root does not dispute that Shorter and Pollen approve of
multi-year tax evasion prosecutions.  Instead, he attempts to
distinguish those cases by drawing a line between prosecutions
under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 for evasion of tax assessment, which
involve efforts to shield taxable income to prevent the IRS from
determining one’s tax liability, and evasion of tax payment,
which concern conduct designed to place assets out of reach to
prevent the IRS from settling one’s tax liability.  See Sansone v.
United States, 380 U.S. 343, 354 (1965); United States v.
McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 230 (3d Cir. 1992).  Here, the
 The Government erroneously argues that Root was3
charged with evading both the assessment and payment of his
taxes.  Though the indictment charged that Root “evaded the
payment of more than $40,000 in federal income taxes,” the
reason Root evaded that payment was that he shielded aspects of
his income from being assessed in the first place.  Under the
Government’s definition, every evasion of assessment would
also be an evasion of payment because the evasion of
assessment would logically lead to a shortfall in tax payment.
Therefore, we reject the Government’s characterization of the
evasion in this case.
             Our concurring colleague asserts that this case is not of4
precedential import because the resolution of the issue we decide
today was foretold by Pollen.  But Pollen concerned an evasion of
payment and this case concerns an evasion of assessment. 
Moreover, to the extent that Pollen addressed only the issue of
“multiplicitous” and not “duplicitous” charges, our decision today
makes clear that the reasoning of Pollen extends to both charging
scenarios.  See Concurrence at 1 n. 1 (“As the issue in Pollen was
whether the indictment was ‘multiplicitous,’ we did not directly
address duplicity as we do here.”).
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Government alleges evasion of assessment, arguing that Root
failed to disclose certain income in an effort to decrease his tax
liability.   By contrast, Shorter and Pollen were evasion of3
payment cases because they involved efforts to shield assets
from recovery by the IRS once the defendants’ tax liabilities
were calculated.  Root argues that unlike evasion of payment
cases, in evasion of assessment cases, the Government must
treat each tax year as the basis for a separate count.4
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In a dictum in Pollen, we acknowledged that evasion of
assessment and evasion of payment cases may be treated
differently under § 7201, noting that the practice of combining
years “is particularly appropriate in a case charging tax evasion
committed through the evasion of payment.”  978 F.2d at 87.
This is because “a defendant attempting to evade payment of
taxes may . . . engage in transactions designed to conceal assets
from the IRS in an attempt to evade the payment of taxes due for
a number of years.”  Id.  By contrast, we explained, “[i]n cases
charging evasion of the assessment of tax, the alleged fraudulent
action of a defendant often directly affects assessment for a
particular tax year.  Consequently, it is logical in that type of
case to charge attempts to evade the assessment of taxes for
distinct years in separate counts.”  Id.  The Fifth Circuit has
similarly remarked: “Because our income tax system is on an
annual basis, failure to report income must be charged for a
specific year.”  United States v. Boulet, 577 F.2d 1165, 1167
(5th Cir. 1978).
Root’s argument also is supported by the Department of
Justice’s Criminal Tax Manual for 2008, which cites “two
distinct manners” by which one can violate § 7201:
Because income taxes are an annual event, an
alleged evasion of assessment must relate to a
specific year and it must be shown that the
income upon which the tax was evaded was
received in that year.  Consequently, in most
evasion of assessment cases, each tax year
charged stands alone as a separate offense.  Thus,
a charge that a taxpayer attempted to evade and
13
defeat taxes for the years 1990, 1991, and 1992
would constitute three separate counts in an
indictment.
Evasion of payment, on the other hand, often
involves single acts which are intended to evade
the payment of several years of tax due the
government.  Thus, in evasion of payment cases,
it is sometimes permissible to charge multiple
years of tax due and owing in one count.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TAX DIVISION
CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL 2008, § 8.07[2] (internal citations
omitted).  The Manual cites both Shorter and Pollen as
examples of cases where courts approved of multi-year evasion
of payment prosecutions.
Notwithstanding the Manual’s guidance — and the
analogous nature of the hypothetical posed therein — we find it
neither controlling nor persuasive.  As a preliminary matter, the
Manual lacks legal authority.  The Manual, which was published
by the Assistant Attorney General for the Department of
Justice’s Tax Division, contains a disclaimer which accurately
notes: “This Manual provides only internal Department of
Justice guidance.  It is not intended to, does not, and may not be
relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.
Nor are any limitations hereby placed on otherwise lawful
litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.”
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Additionally, the distinctions drawn in the Manual do not
follow from the statutory language, which penalizes “[a]ny
person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof.”  26 U.S.C.
§ 7201.  Section 7201 neither distinguishes between evasion of
assessment and evasion of payment, nor suggests that one type
of evasion should be treated differently than the other for
purposes of determining the unit of prosecution.  Instead, the
statute focuses on a defendant’s acts — his willful attempts to
evade or defeat any tax “in any manner” — rather than
concentrating on the year or years when such conduct occurred.
As we explained in Pollen: “The language of section 7201 is
straightforward: it prohibits ‘willful attempts in any manner to
evade or defeat any tax.’  It proscribes ‘attempts’ to evade or
defeat any tax and thus speaks in terms of the act of evasion, as
well as the taxes evaded.”  978 F.2d at 86; see also Spies v.
United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943) (analyzing predecessor
tax evasion statute) (“Congress did not define or limit the
methods by which a willful attempt to defeat and evade might be
accomplished and perhaps did not define lest its effort to do so
result in some unexpected limitation.”).
As in Pollen, our inquiry here concerns Root’s conduct,
regardless of the length of time over which his acts took place.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1) allows a single
count to allege “that the defendant committed [the offense] by
one or more specified means.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1)
(emphasis added).  It is true, of course, that taxes are assessed on
an annual basis; in that sense, Root willfully evaded his 2001
federal tax assessment, his 2002 assessment, and his 2003
assessment.  However, as the District Court found, each year’s
 For the same reason, Root’s reliance on United States5
v. Smith, 335 F.2d 898 (7th Cir. 1964), asks too much.  In that
case, the government brought separate counts alleging that the
defendant evaded his taxes in 1951, 1952, and 1953.  The
defendant claimed a due process violation with regard to the
1951 count and sought dismissal of his entire case as a result.
The Seventh Circuit disagreed: “We agree that the three counts
might be said to pertain to a ‘continuing course of illegal
conduct,’ in the sense that the intention was to avoid taxes so
15
evasion resulted from the same conduct: a multi-year scheme in
which he funneled money through a limited liability company
and a sole proprietorship to hide money from the IRS.  The
Government alleged evasion of assessment of the same sources
of income for all three tax years:  the commission payments to
New Perspectives and the legal work performed for Ford and
Merullo, as well as payments received from Parker in 2001 and
2002.  Furthermore, Pollen’s dictum does not foreclose an
evasion of assessment prosecution relating to multiple years; it
merely observes that an evasion of assessment “often” affects
the assessment of a single year’s income.  In this case, however,
Root’s evasive acts affected the assessment income for multiple
years.
Accordingly, we decline Root’s invitation to treat evasion
of assessment cases differently than evasion of payment cases
and we hold  that the reasoning of Pollen extends to evasion of
assessment prosecutions as well.  Though the Government could
have brought three separate counts for this single pattern of
events spanning three years, section 7201 does not require that
it do so.   5
long as payoffs continued, but in a criminal tax evasion case
each year stands alone, and the failure to pay taxes in each of the
years involved constitutes a separate offense.”  Id. at 900-01.
Root argues that Smith requires that the appropriate unit of
prosecution must be one year.  But Smith indicates only that the
1952 and 1953 charges can exist independent of the 1951
charge, even if those charges were part of a larger pattern of
activity that also included the 1951 count which was under
challenge.  This supports the notion that charges for separate




Our inquiry in the present case is not limited simply to
consideration of whether the text of section 7201 permits the
Government to charge Root’s conduct in a single count.  Rather,
we next examine the concerns traditionally associated with
charging “in one count what could be several independent
charges” and conclude that they are not implicated in this case.
Shorter, 809 F.2d at 58 n.1.  The purposes of the prohibition
against duplicity include: (1) avoiding the uncertainty of
whether a general verdict of guilty conceals a finding of guilty
as to one crime and a finding of not guilty as to another; (2)
avoiding the risk that the jurors may not have been unanimous
as to any one of the crimes charged; (3) assuring the defendant
adequate notice; (4) providing the basis for appropriate
sentencing; and (5) protecting against double jeopardy in a
subsequent prosecution.  Id.; United States v. Margiotta, 646
F.2d 729, 732-33 (2d Cir. 1981).  An assessment of such policy
considerations is critical to any duplicity analysis, for
17
fundamental fairness and due process of law may prohibit
combining what could be several independent charges into a
single count, even if the text of a particular statute allows it.  See
Shorter, 809 F.2d at 58 n.1 (“in determining whether fairness
requires dismissal of an indictment which includes in one count
what could be several independent charges, the Court must
measure that indictment against the purposes of the prohibition
against duplicity.”). 
These concerns are absent in this case because Root’s
evasive conduct was consistent during the three-year time
period.  Because Root was engaged in a “continuous course of
conduct,” the evidence relating to each year is identical and it
would be logically inconsistent for the jury to find Root guilty
in light of his 2001 conduct, but not guilty based upon the same
conduct in 2002 and 2003.  Root implies that the Government
lumped the years together to meet section 7201’s requirement of
a “substantial tax deficiency.”  See United States v. McKee, 506
F.3d 225, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2007).  The record demonstrates Root
evaded the assessment of more than $50,000 of income in each
of the years in question.  While we have not yet spoken on what
specific dollar amount constitutes a “substantial” deficiency, our
sister circuits have established a fairly low threshold.  See
United States v. Davenport, 824 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (7th Cir.
1987) ($3,358.68 in taxes evaded sufficient to support
taxpayer’s conviction); United States v. Gross, 286 F.2d 59, 60-
61 (2d Cir. 1961) (unreported income in the amount of two
$2,500 payments deemed “substantial”); United States v. Nunan,
236 F.2d 576, 585 (2d Cir. 1956) (“[A] few thousand dollars of
omissions of taxable income may in a given case warrant
criminal prosecution.”).  Accordingly, Root’s evasion — even
             The concurrence correctly notes that inflation6
diminishes the real value of money over time.  See
Concurrence at 22-23.  Thus, the “$3,358.68 of taxes held to
be substantial evasion for the tax year 1980 in Davenport . . .
is equivalent to $7,218.72 in 2001, the first year for which
Root is charged.”  Id. at 22 (analyzing Davenport, 824 F.2d at
1516-17).  This inflationary impact, the concurrence argues,
undermines the significance of several of the older cases we
cite to support our conclusion that section 7201’s requirement
of a “substantial” tax deficiency does not set a high bar for the
Government.  Id.  
In the present case, however, Root’s individual tax
deficiency amounted to $11,571 in 2001, $19,619 in 2002,
and $6,473 in 2003.  Therefore, even after accounting for the
effect of inflation, Root’s tax deficiency for the years 2001
and 2002 would still far exceed the low level found to be
“substantial” in Davenport.  Further, Root’s tax deficiency of
$6,473 for 2003 would be just $745.72 less than the 2001
equivalent of the tax deficiency that the Seventh Circuit found
to be substantial in Davenport. 
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when considered in single-year increments — was
“substantial.”6
Moreover, Root cannot point to any valid sentencing
concern.  Instead of being convicted for three single-year counts
of tax evasion, Root was convicted on one three-year count.  “In
such circumstances, duplicity may actually inure to a
defendant’s benefit by limiting the maximum penalties he might
face if he were charged and convicted on separate counts for
what amounts to a single scheme.”  United States v. Olmeda,
19
461 F.3d 271, 281 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted)
(assessing practice of charging two illegal ammunition
possessions in a single count).
“If the doctrine of duplicity is to be more than an exercise
in mere formalism, it must be invoked only when an indictment
affects the policy considerations” that underlie that doctrine.
United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 897 (2d Cir. 1980).  The
identification of these considerations suggests that a single count
of an indictment should not be found impermissibly duplicitous
whenever it contains several allegations that could have been
stated as separate offenses, but only when the failure to do so
risks unfairness to the defendant.  See Cohen v. United States,
378 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1967); see also United States v.
Sturdivant, 244 F.3d 71, 75 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that
duplicitous charging is impermissible only if it prejudices
defendant).  That risk is slight in a case like this where the
alleged wrong is a single scheme to defraud that can be proven
by evidence relating to similar conduct over a period of years.
In sum, because the statutory language does not prohibit
the Government’s decision to charge Root for multiple years in
one count and because analysis of the concerns traditionally
associated with duplicitous charges demonstrates that Root was
not prejudiced by that decision, we hold that the Government’s
charge was not impermissibly duplicitous.   Accordingly, we




Root next argues that the District Court lacked venue as
to the tax evasion count and that his case should have been
brought in Ohio, where he resides.  We review a District Court’s
denial of a motion to change venue for abuse of discretion.  U.S.
v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 1991).  The Government
bears the burden of proving venue by a preponderance of the
evidence and venue must be proper for each  count of the
indictment.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 328-30 (3d
Cir. 2002).
Proper venue in criminal trials is more than just a
procedural requirement; it is a constitutionally guaranteed
safeguard.  United States v. Baxter, 884 F.2d 734, 736 (3d Cir.
1989).  The Constitution states: “The Trial of all Crimes . . .
shall be held in the State where said Crimes shall have been
committed . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.  Furthermore,
the Sixth Amendment provides:  “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(emphasis added).
In addition to the constitutional requirements, Rule 18 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “Unless a
statute or these rules permit otherwise, the government must
prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was
committed.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 18.  We have held that Congress
has the power to lay out the elements of a crime to permit
21
prosecution in one or any of the districts in which the crucial
elements are performed.  Perez, 280 F.3d at 329.
Root argues that his constitutional and statutory rights
were violated because he was prosecuted in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania instead of the Northern District of Ohio, where
most of the activity in this case took place.  For instance, Root
filed his tax returns, earned his LISA income, received his
income from Parker, and performed much of his services for
RBI in the state of Ohio.  As Root acknowledges, however,
some of his illegal activities occurred within the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania.  RBI is headquartered in Reading and the
Commission Agreement between RBI and New Perspectives
was found at RBI’s offices there.  Additionally, Root often
traveled to Reading in connection with his job.
Given Root’s contacts with the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, we find that venue was proper there.  Tax evasion
is a continuing offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), United States
v. Barker, 556 F.3d 682, 689 (8th Cir. 2009), and Congress has
provided that an offense against the United States that spans
multiple districts “may be inquired of and prosecuted in any
district in which such offense was begun, continued, or
completed.”  18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).  The locality of a crime for
the purpose of venue extends “over the whole area through
which force propelled by an offender operates.” United States v.
Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944).  As we have noted, Root
was responsible for a “consistent, long-term pattern of conduct”
which spanned numerous years and took place in multiple states
and districts.  Although Root’s taxes were mailed from another
jurisdiction, he does not dispute that “a few of [the acts leading
22
to the evasion] occurred in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.”  Consequently, venue was proper there under 18
U.S.C. § 3237(a).
Root argues that “[a]ll charges could have been brought
by the Government in Ohio.”  This argument, while true, is of
no moment.  Even though a substantial portion of Root’s acts
were committed in the Northern District of Ohio and he may
have preferred that he had been charged there, nothing required
the Government to charge Root where a majority of the acts
took place.  While Root is correct in noting that the Supreme
Court has not recognized pendent jurisdiction in criminal cases,
see United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1998), his appeal
does not implicate pendent jurisdiction; the allegations of tax
evasion were brought in a single count which, as determined in
Part II supra, was not duplicitous.  Furthermore, the jury was
specifically instructed that, “[f]or you to return a guilty verdict,
the government must convince you that some act in furtherance
of the crime charged . . . took place here in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania.”  The jury so found.  Accordingly, Root was
subject to trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the
District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his
motion to dismiss for improper venue.
IV.
Finally, Root argues that his conspiracy conviction —
which alleged that Root and McCracken agreed to impede the
lawful function of the IRS in the assessment and collection of
Root’s income taxes — should be vacated because the
Government presented insufficient evidence to prove a
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conspiracy to defraud the government.  Root must overcome a
“very heavy burden” to overturn the jury’s verdict for
insufficiency of the evidence.  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d
180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998).  We will sustain his conviction if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, “any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996)
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
To establish a conspiracy to defraud the United States in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, the Government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) an agreement to defraud the
United States; (2) an overt act by one of the conspirators in
furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) an intent on the part of the
conspirators to agree as well as to defraud the United States.
McKee, 506 F.3d at 238.
Root argues that the Government cannot meet its burden
with regard to the first prong because it cannot prove an
agreement between Root and McCracken to defraud the United
States.  Root argues that to prove that he and McCracken
conspired to defraud the United States, the Government must
prove not only that Root himself evaded taxes, but also that
McCracken did so as well.  This argument overstates the
Government’s burden.
Root relies heavily on United States v. Adkinson, 158
F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 1998), in which the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit reversed the convictions of four defendants
in the absence of “evidence of an agreement by all for each to
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evade his income taxes.”  158 F.3d at 1154.  Adkinson is
factually distinguishable, however.  In that case, in addition to
asserting a conspiracy, the Government alleged that each of the
three defendants had failed to file tax returns or filed a false
return.  Id. at 1154 n.15.  Therefore, the court required
“evidence of an agreement by all for each to evade his income
taxes.”  This stray language should not be interpreted to require
that all tax-related conspiracies require that each conspirator file
a false return.  In Root’s case, the Government need only prove
that he and McCracken agreed to impede the lawful functions of
the IRS in some manner and that one of the two men took some
overt act in furtherance of that goal.
In the present case, the Government asserts that Root and
McCracken conspired to defraud the United States with respect
to Root’s taxes; there is no need for the Government to prove
that the men also conspired with regard to McCracken’s taxes as
well.  If they also conspired to defraud the IRS with respect to
McCracken’s taxes — which is not alleged in this case — that
would be an entirely different conspiracy and could have been
charged separately.
Root also argues that the Government did not prove that
Root and McCracken had any agreement.  Though there is no
direct evidence of an agreement in this case, an agreement to
defraud the United States “can be proven circumstantially based
upon reasonable inferences drawn from actions and statements
of the conspirators or from the circumstances surrounding the
scheme.”  McKee, 506 F.3d at 238; see also United States v.
Smith, 294 F.3d 473, 478 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that a
reasonable juror could certainly conclude that a tacit agreement
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exists amongst a group of people when they engage in “so many
unusual acts”); United States v. Barr, 963 F.2d 641, 650 (3d Cir.
1992) (“It is well settled that a written or spoken agreement
among alleged co-conspirators is unnecessary; rather, indirect
evidence of [a] mere tacit understanding will suffice.”).  When
the Government relies on circumstantial evidence to establish a
tax conspiracy, “the circumstances must be such as to warrant a
jury’s finding that the alleged conspirators had some common
design with unity of purpose to impede the IRS.”  McKee, 506
F.2d at 240.  The evidence must be sufficient to show that
impeding the IRS was one of the conspiracy’s objects, and not
merely a foreseeable consequence or collateral effect.  United
States v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 348 (3d Cir. 2002).
The Government presented ample circumstantial
evidence to support the jury’s finding that Root and McCracken
had an agreement to defraud the IRS with regard to Root’s
taxes.  Root was not an uneducated citizen caught up in the
complexities of the tax code; he was an experienced
businessman and former lawyer who had knowledge of tax
issues and  familiarity with creating limited liability companies
and proprietorships.  Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, a reasonable juror could conclude that
Root’s requests to have his commissions and other payments
directed to New Perspectives and LISA were intended to avoid
paying income taxes on that income.  Indeed, shortly after Root
requested in writing that McCracken assign his commission
payments to New Perspectives, McCracken directed RBI’s
bookkeeper, Barbara Williamson, to send Root’s payments to
New Perspectives and his own payments to a limited liability
company that Root had created for him.  A reasonable juror
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could infer that the men had discussed the benefits of diverting
payments to a limited liability company and that McCracken
decided to follow Root’s example.  Furthermore, Williamson
testified that she had a discussion with both McCracken and
Root regarding whether 1099s should be issued to their
respective limited liability companies with regard to those
payments.  The men said they would look into the matter, but
McCracken later told Williamson that she need not fill out such
forms.  Though Williamson could not recall whether Root
participated in the second conversation, a reasonable juror could
infer that Root and McCracken agreed to misinform Williamson
in an attempt to conceal Root’s income.  Finally, at Root’s
request, McCracken signed a “Commission Agreement”
diverting Root’s commissions to New Perspectives.  Root’s wife
Kathy signed that agreement on behalf of New Perspectives,
even though Thomas Root performed all of the services meriting
those payments.  The Commission Agreement was later found
at RBI in a folder marked “Framco,” allowing a reasonable juror
to connect McCracken’s limited liability company with Root’s
limited liability company.  Accordingly, we hold that the
evidence was sufficient to support Root’s conspiracy conviction.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error by the
District Court and will affirm Root’s judgment of conviction.
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McKee, Circuit Judge, Concurring in the Judgment. 
My colleagues believe “the principal question of
precedential import on appeal [in this case] is whether the
Government may charge a defendant for evading the assessment
of taxes for multiple years in a single count.”  Maj. Op. at 2.
However, the answer to that question is foretold by our decision
in United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1992).  There,
we adopted the analysis of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987).  As I will discuss
below, in Pollen, the Government combined different methods
of violating 26 U.S.C. § 7201, into four counts of tax evasion,
but each was for the same seven-year time frame.  Pollen argued
that charging him in this manner subjected him to multiple
punishments for the same offense and was therefore
7 As the issue in Pollen was whether the indictment was “multiplicitous,” we did not directly
address duplicity as we do here.  See 1A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 142 (3d ed. 1999) (“[M]ultiplicity” refers to the Government improperly charging the same offense
in multiple counts; “duplicity” refers to an indictment where the Government charges two or more
distinct offenses in one count.  In the latter situation, it cannot be determined if the jury’s verdict was
unanimous as to each distinct offense.)  See also United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 589, 594 n.4 (3d
Cir. 1983) (“Appellant . . . argues that the charge in Count V . . . is ‘duplicitous’ of the Count I
conspiracy charge encompassing the same events. ‘Duplicity is the joining in a single count of two
or more distinct and separate offenses.’ . . . But duplicity, so defined, is not what appellant is
complaining about.  We assume that appellant means that Counts I and V are multiplicitous, i.e., they
charge the same offense, . . . and that he was thus placed in double jeopardy because the overt acts
alleged in the two counts were identical.”). 
As will be seen from the discussion that follows, although Pollen involved multiplicity and
not duplicity, the doctrines are quite similar and they both limit the manner in which multiple crimes
(or a course of conduct constituting a single crime) can be charged.  I therefore agree that Pollen is
relevant to Root’s claim of duplicity. 
28
“impermissibly multiplicitous.”  Pollen, 978 F.2d at 83.   In7
rejecting that argument, we relied on Shorter and held: “[i]t is .
. . permissible under section 7201 to charge tax evasion covering
several years in a single count as a ‘course of conduct’ in
circumstances ‘where the underlying basis of the indictment is
an allegedly consistent, long-term pattern of conduct directed at
the evasion of taxes for those years.’” Id. at 84 (quoting Shorter,
809 F.2d at 58). 
8 Pollen is somewhat distinguishable because the indictment there charged evasion
of taxes rather than the evasion of assessment that the Government charged here.
Nevertheless, the reasoning of Pollen should apply with full force here.  My colleagues
dismiss the significance of that distinction in making their determination that this indictment
does not violate due process while disregarding the extent to which the analysis in Pollen
applies here.
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Therefore, the question posed by my colleagues is
not as novel as my colleagues suggest.   In Pollen, we relied on8
Shorter in determining whether a single charge for multiple
years was permissible under the relevant statutory provision, 26
U.S.C. § 7201, based on the provision’s legislative history and
the nature of the conduct proscribed by the statute.  The same
statutory provision is at issue here.  Accordingly, we need not
focus on whether the Government can combine several
violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 into a single count as a matter of
law. We have already determined that it can.  We should instead
be focusing on whether the Government may do so here without
transgressing the defendant’s right to due process of law.  More
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precisely, we should question whether the Government denied
Root due process of law by joining 3 tax years into a single
count of tax evasion under these circumstances.  For reasons I
shall explain, I believe the indictment is improperly duplicitous
and created the potential for the jury to convict on Count Two
even though not all jurors agreed that he was guilty for evading
taxes in each of the years charged in that count.  However, as my
colleagues explain, “the record demonstrates Root evaded the
assessment of more than $50,000 of income in each of the years
in question.”  Maj. Op. at 15.  Accordingly, this clearly
duplicitous indictment “did not impair the integrity of the trial
as a whole or put the case in such a different light so as to
undermine confidence in the verdict.”  United States v. Milan,
304 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2002).  I therefore concur in the
judgment.   Nevertheless, I believe that this indictment was
duplicitous, and I am in dubitante about the propriety of finding
9 “The term ‘dubitante’ ‘is [used] . . . to signify that [a judge] doubted the decision
rendered.’” Black's Law Dictionary 448 (5th ed. 1979); see Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Cmty
Affairs of State of N.J., 919 F.2d 183, 202 (3d Cir. 1990).
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venue for Count Two in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
under the circumstances here.9
I. Background.
The indictment originally charged Root with a
single count of income tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
7201 as to his 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax returns.  26
U.S.C. § 7201 provides: 
Any person who willfully attempts
in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax imposed by this title or the
payment thereof shall . . . be guilty
of a felony and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more
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than $100,000 . . . , or imprisoned
not more than 5 years, or both . . . .
After he was indicted, Root filed an omnibus pretrial
motion in which he argued (in part) that venue in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania was improper because all of the actions
underlying the alleged tax evasion in 2000 occurred in Ohio.  In
response, during a subsequent telephone conference with the
court, the Government agreed to drop the charges related to
10 The district court explains the proceedings leading to the Government’s agreeing
to forego any violation for 2000 as follows:
Defendant argued that . . . all of the allegations of evasive acts and tax deficiency for
the year covered by the 2000 tax return occurred exclusively in Ohio. . . . Ultimately,
following a hearing, this Court denied Defendant's motion without prejudice, noting
that the Defendant would have the opportunity to reassert any objection to venue at
trial. 
     In the weeks leading up to trial, Defendant again attacked Count Two, asking the Court to dismiss
Count Two as duplicitous, and reasserting his venue objection.  Following a telephone conference,
the Government agreed to drop the allegations pertaining to the year 2000 from Count Two of the
Indictment.  
United States v. Root, 560 F. Supp. 2d 402, 411 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
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offense conduct that occurred in 2000.   Root also argued that10
Count II was duplicitous.
“Duplicity is the improper joining of distinct and
separate offenses in a single count [of an indictment].”  United
States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 1998).  As we
explained in Haddy, “[d]uplicitous counts may conceal the
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specific charges, prevent the jury from deciding guilt or
innocence with respect to a particular offense, . . . or endanger
fair sentencing.”  Id. (citing Shorter, 809 F.2d at 58 n.1).  “An
indictment should be dismissed as impermissibly duplicitous .
. . if trial on a single count would be unfair to the defendant.”
United States v. Shorter, 608 F. Supp. 871, 879 (D.D.C. 1985)
(collecting cases), aff’d, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 817 (1987).  Improperly aggregating multiple
violations of law into a single count (absent precautions that
were not taken here) is improper because “there [may be] no
way of knowing with a general verdict on . . . separate offenses
joined in a single count whether the jury was unanimous with
respect to [any of the offenses].”  United States v. Starks, 515
F.2d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 1975).
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 As the majority explains, to establish Root’s
criminal liability under § 7201 for conduct that occurred during
the 3 remaining years on which the parties went to trial, the
Government was required to present evidence showing a
“substantial tax deficiency.” Maj. Op. at 15 (citing United States
v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2007)).  It is axiomatic
that the right to trial by jury “require[s] criminal convictions to
rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of
every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510
(1995).  Accordingly, the jury had to decide whether the amount
of the deficiency that the Government charged was actually
“substantial” in each year in which he was charged with
violating § 7201.
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 My colleagues rely heavily on Pollen and Shorter
to support their conclusion that Count Two – which grouped tax
evasion charges for 2001, 2002 and 2003 – is not duplicitous;
the Government’s brief also makes frequent reference to those
cases.  However, a closer examination of both of those cases
reveals that neither supports the Government’s decision to indict
Root for evasion of taxes over 3 years in 1 count, as the
Government did here.  In fact, both support Root’s claim that
Count Two was impermissibly duplicitous.
II. Shorter and Pollen Do Not Support Combining
Tax Years in One Count Without Appropriate
Precautions.
The defendant in Shorter was charged with twelve
separate offenses of tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
7201, by failing to pay income taxes for the years 1972 through
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1983, as well as several misdemeanor counts not relevant to our
discussion.  See Shorter, 809 F.2d at 56.  He challenged the
indictment arguing that it improperly included offenses that
were beyond the statute of limitations and that combining
several tax years was “impermissibly duplicitous.”  Id.  In
rejecting the argument, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia agreed with other courts of appeals and held that it is
permissible to charge conspiracy to evade several years’ taxes
as one count “where the underlying basis of the indictment is an
allegedly consistent, long-term pattern of conduct directed at the
evasion of taxes for these years.”  Id. (citations omitted).  The
court of appeals also noted that any analysis of a claim of
duplicity must look to, “(1) the language and legislative history
of the statute and (2) the nature of the proscribed conduct.”  Id.
(citing Shorter, 608 F. Supp. at 877).  That is what the majority
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does here, and I do not disagree with that part of my colleagues’
analysis.
However, another factor was crucial to the district
court’s rejection of Shorter’s duplicity claim and the appellate
court’s affirmation of that ruling.  As the district court
explained: “[Shorter’s] duplicity argument stands or falls not on
the narrow basis of tax evasion law but on how it measures up
against more general principles.”  Shorter, 608 F. Supp. at 876-
77.  Thus, the district court made clear that “if trial on a single
count would be unfair to the defendant,”  a duplicitous
indictment should be dismissed even though the charging statute
may otherwise permit it.  Id. at 879.  
To determine whether the indictment required
dismissal to remedy unfair prejudice to the defendant, the
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district court realized that it “must measure [the] indictment
against the purposes of the prohibition against duplicity.”  Id.
As my colleagues have outlined, these purposes include
generally: 1) the prevention of double jeopardy, 2) the assurance
of adequate notice to the defendant, 3) the provision of a basis
for appropriate sentencing, 4) the danger that a conviction was
produced by a verdict that may not have been unanimous as to
any one of the crimes charged, and 5) avoiding the uncertainty
of whether a general verdict of guilty as to one crime conceals
a verdict of not guilty as to another crime.  Maj. Op. at 14-15.
Here, that means that we must assess “the danger that a
conviction was produced by a verdict that may not have been
unanimous as to any one of the crimes charged.”  Shorter, 608
F. Supp. at 876-77.  As I explain below, I believe the majority’s
analysis incorrectly dismisses the danger of a verdict lacking
11  I acknowledge that the statute of limitations issue exacerbated the potential
prejudice in Shorter with respect to the duplicity claim.  The statute of limitations for tax
evasion is six years.  26 U.S.C. § 6531.  Shorter was charged with a single felony count of
willful attempt to evade payment of income taxes due from 1972 through 1983, and arguably
risked conviction for years beyond the reach of the statute of limitations.  The verdict was
returned in 1984, thus creating the potential of a conviction based on Shorter’s failure to pay
taxes only in a year that fell beyond the statute of limitations.  See Shorter, 608 F. Supp. at
881.
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unanimity that could arise from the inclusion of multiple years
of evasion of assessment in one count. 
In its analysis of whether the indictment was fair,
the district court in Shorter realized the risk that some jurors
may vote for conviction based on actions that took place in one
year, while other jurors might return a guilty verdict based on
conduct in an entirely different year.   See Shorter, 608 F. Supp11
at 881.  The district court offered the following explanation of
how it would address that danger:
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The Court has concluded that,
while . . . the prosecution may go
forward on the basis of the present
indictment, the defendant is entitled
to be protected against the danger
that, on such an indictment, he will
be convicted not on the basis of one
unanimous verdict on a single set
of facts but under juror votes for
conviction which, depending on the
particular member of the jury,
relate to entirely different years.
Both interests may be accommodated by appropriate jury
instructions and special interrogatories to the jury.  To this end,
the Court intends to instruct the jury in some detail on these
issues and to request it to answer special interrogatories.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
The district court’s concern was not overlooked by
the court of appeals.  The court of appeals upheld the district
court’s conclusion that the evasion of payment of taxes could be
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charged in one count as a “continuous course of conduct,” but
made clear that the inquiry did not end there.  In affirming the
district court’s rejection of Shorter’s duplicity claim, the court
of appeals explained: “The District Court correctly noted also
that in determining whether fairness requires dismissal of an
indictment which includes in one count what could be several
independent charges, the Court must measure that indictment
against the purposes of the prohibition against duplicity. . . .
The District Court held that all four purposes were met here.
We agree.”  809 F.2d at 58 n.4 (citing Shorter, 608 F. Supp. at
879) (italics added).  
In Pollen, the defendant pled guilty to four counts
of attempting to evade and defeat payment of his personal
income taxes.  Each of those counts charged a different method
of evasion for the same group of seven years: 1967, 1970, 1972
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through 1975, and 1982.  Pollen had “made several international
transfers of hundreds of thousands of dollars and secreted
equally valuable assets in the United States, in attempts to evade
payment of his taxes . . . for a total of seven tax years.”  Id. at
86.  The acts of evasion of payment charged in the different
counts included: 1) “placing part of his assets out of reach of the
Government by causing approximately $690,000 in gold to be
brought to the Swiss Bank Corporation, Toronto, Canada, with
instructions to further transfer the gold to a nominee account” in
Switzerland, 2) “transporting an additional $285,000” to the
same bank with similar instructions, 3) using “currency, money
orders, and cashiers checks to buy assets and pay expenditures”
and 4) “maintaining more than $350,000 in gold bars and coins,
jewelry, and gems in safety deposit boxes at the First Union
National Bank of North Carolina” under a false name.  Pollen,
978 F.2d at 82 (internal citation omitted).
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In fact, for years, Pollen had conducted his affairs
in such a manner as to avoid payment of all taxes, regardless of
year, and to both hide and disguise assets that could be seized to
satisfy his tax obligations.  “He did not know for which years he
owed which portion of the taxes he was attempting to evade.”
Id.  The uncontested evidence established that Pollen’s actions
did not correspond to any time frame, i.e., no act of evasion was
directed toward any tax year nor any particular tax obligation.
During his guilty plea colloquy, Pollen repeatedly stated that he
knew he owed substantial taxes at the time of his conduct, but
was unaware of the specific tax years he was attempting to
evade.  See id. at 86.  Against that backdrop, we concluded:
[O]n the facts of this case it is clear
that Pollen attempted to evade all
of the taxes he owed for the group
of years in question through the
several significant affirmative acts
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of evasion charged in the counts to
which he pleaded guilty.  Under
these circumstances, where the acts
of evasion charged in each count
involve funds far greater than the
taxes owed for any particular year,
and, as Pollen himself indicated,
each act was intended to evade
payment of all taxes owed, not
merely those owed for a particular
year, we conclude that section 7201
permits a unit of prosecution based
on separate significant acts of
evasion.  Each willful attempt to
evade taxes that involves funds of
an amount that cannot logically be
broken down and classified as
relating to a particular tax year is
an allowable unit of prosecution
under the plain language of this
section and so can be separately
charged as evasion of the taxes
owed for a group of tax years. 
Id. (emphasis added).   
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“Under [those] circumstances,” we had no trouble
finding that it was appropriate to charge multiple years in a
single count as authorized by Congress.  The facts that 1) the
acts of evasion involved funds that were greater than the taxes
Pollen owed for a particular year, and 2) that there was evidence
that each act was intended to evade payment of all taxes owed
and not directed to a specific year, were dispositive to our
conclusion.  We therefore explained: 
the unit of prosecution we
recognize in this opinion is
particularly appropriate in a case
charging tax evasion committed
through the evasion of payment.  In
cases charging evasion of the
assessment of tax, the alleged
fraudulent action of a defendant
often directly affects assessment for
a particular tax year. Consequently,
it is logical in that type of case to
charge attempts to evade the
assessment of taxes for distinct
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years in separate counts. Evasion of
payment cases, however, stand in
sharp contrast to evasion of
assessment cases. A defendant
attempting to evade payment of
taxes may, as in this case, engage in
transactions designed to conceal
assets from the IRS in an attempt to
evade the payment of taxes due for
a number of years. As a result in
evasion of payment cases it is
log ica l to  charge distinct,
significant attempts to evade the
payment of tax for the same group
of tax years in separate counts.
Id. at 87. 
It is important to note that both Pollen and Shorter
involved evasion of payment rather than the evasion of
assessment that is charged here.  This distinction does not
change the applicable legal analysis that was set forth in Shorter,
and adopted in Pollen.  However, where an indictment charges
evasion of assessment, the risk of a denial of due process is
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greatly increased for reasons that were apparent to the district
court in Shorter and should be apparent here.  
The majority too readily dismisses our discussion
of this distinction in Pollen as “dictum,” despite its importance
to our analysis there.  See Maj. Op. at 11 (“In a dictum in Pollen,
we acknowledged that evasion of assessment and evasion of
payment cases may be treated differently under § 7201, noting
that the practice of combining years ‘is particularly appropriate
in a case charging tax evasion committed through the evasion of
payment.’”) (citing Pollen, 978 F.2d at 87).  
Although the crimes of evasion of assessment and
evasion of taxes “frequently overlap,” see United States v. Mal,
942 F.2d 682, 688 (9th Cir. 1991), § 7201 nevertheless defines
12  My colleagues correctly note that it is easy to conflate evasion of assessment and
evasion of taxes because the only reason to evade tax assessments is the concomitant evasion
of the applicable taxes.   See Maj. Op. at 10 n. 3.  There is no reason to evade an assessment
if the corresponding taxes are not also evaded. The majority recognizes the distinction and
correctly rejects the Government’s attempt to recast this case as an evasion of payment.  See
id.  (“Under the Government’s definition, every evasion of assessment would also be an
evasion of payment because the evasion of assessment would logically lead to a shortfall in
tax payment.  Therefore, we reject the Government’s characterization of the evasion in this
case.”) (italics in original). 
13 Although, the Court made clear in Sansone that § 7201 includes two different
crimes, some courts take the position that it charges only one crime and simply specifies two
methods of violating the statute.  See United States v. Waldeck, 909 F.2d 555, 557 (1st Cir.
1990) (“Sometimes it is convenient to say that different methods are different ‘crimes,’” but
noting “[w]e are not so bold as to either ignore or shunt Sansone aside . . . .”). 
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them as separate and distinct offenses.   See Sansone v. United12
States, 380 U.S. 343, 354 (1965); compare United States v.
McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 1992) (listing elements of
“evasion of payment”) with Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d
760, 770 (9th Cir. 1962) (listing various means of evading
assessment).   As Pollen illustrates, evasion of taxes frequently13
results in difficulty aligning offense conduct with a particular
tax year or tax deficiency because the defendant intends to evade
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payment of actual taxes, not just assessments that would define
tax obligations accruing in a particular tax period.  Conduct
intended to evade a tax assessment corresponds to the tax year
of the affected assessment and can therefore readily be charged
according to the applicable tax year.  Moreover, it should be
charged according to the applicable tax year. 
Thus, our holding in Pollen expressly approved
charging multiple years of evasive conduct in violation of §
7201 in a single count “under . . . circumstances” where the
evasive conduct could not be connected to “a particular year.”
Pollen, 978 F.2d 86; see, e.g., McGill, 964 F.2d at 233 (holding
that a shift of bank account use after an IRS levy on other
accounts over two and a half years constituted evasion of
payment); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 554-56 (7th
Cir. 1987) (involving aggregation of numerous acts of
14See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Fonesca, 274 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that
discussion that is not part of the holding is dicta).
51
concealment that took place over four years, including
repeatedly placing assets in the names of family members and
dealing in currency only); United States v. Mollet, 290 F.2d 273,
274-75 (2d Cir. 1961) (concluding that refusal over a four-year
period to inform IRS officers about the existence of brokerage
accounts that could assist in paying taxes due constituted
evasion of payment).  That is not the situation here, and I am
troubled that my colleagues seem so willing to overlook
language in Pollen that was so important to the analysis there
merely because it can arguably be labeled “dictum.”14
Absent appropriate jury instructions and/or special
interrogatories that address the risk of conviction on less than a
unanimous verdict as to each year assessed, we should not
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tolerate indictments (such as the one offered here), which lump
violations of multiple assessments into a single count. 
Moreover, when “measur[ing] that indictment against the
purposes of prohibition against duplicity[,]” we must carefully
consider the risk of an unfair and unjust outcome.  Shorter, 608
F. Supp. at 879. 
III. The Law of Other Jurisdictions and DOJ Policy are
Consistent with Pollen.
The “logical” method of charging that we explained in
Pollen, i.e., charging distinct years in separate charges, has been
followed by our sister courts of appeals.  See, e.g., United States
v. Anthony, 545 F.3d 60, 62 n.1 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that the
four-count indictment charging defendant of “willfully
attempt[ing] to evade and defeat the assessment of the income
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tax due and owing” corresponded with the years 1999, 2000,
2001, and 2002); United States v. Thompson, 518 F.3d 832, 838
(10th Cir. 2008) (“[Defendants] were indicted on . . . six counts
of tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, for the tax years
1992 through 1997.”); United States v. Nolen, 472 F.3d 362, 369
(5th Cir. 2006) (involving a three-count indictment for evasion
of income taxes that corresponds with the years 1997, 1998, and
1999 where case involved both evasion of payment and
assessment); United States v. Carlson, 235 F.3d 466, 468 (9th
Cir. 2000) (charging defendant with three counts of evasion of
assessment for the years 1991, 1992, and 1993); Mal, 942 F.2d
at 684 (indicting defendant for five counts of tax evasion under
26 U.S.C. § 7201, “one for each calendar year”); United States
v. Davenport, 824 F.2d 1511, 1515 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he
district court denied the defendant’s motion [for judgment of
acquittal] as to Count One, which was the tax evasion charge for
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the year 1980.”); United States v. Gross, 286 F.2d 59, 60 (2d
Cir. 1961) (“Gross was convicted only on Counts II and III,
relating to understatement of net income and of tax in the returns
for 1954 and 1955”).  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has explicitly stated that evasion of assessment “must” be
charged for each year in that manner.  See United States v.
Boulet, 577 F.2d 1165, 1167 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
The Government’s proof of the defendant’s guilt
in Boulet was similar to a “net worth” prosecution.  The
Government had to present proof of income at the start of the
charged period and then establish that any subsequent income
was from a taxable source, and also earned, during the charged
period.  The Government therefore had to examine all of
Boulet’s bank deposits, establish the amount of taxable income,
show proof of cash expenditures from taxable income, if any,
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and then reduce that amount by applicable deductions.  The
evidence in such a case is far more circumstantial and evasion
far more difficult for the Government to prove than in a case
like this one.  See id. at 1168.  Nevertheless, even though the
method of proof there was more analogous to the prosecutions
in Pollen and Shorter than to the prosecution here, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made clear that “[i]t is part of the
government’s burden of proof to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that the expenditures and deposits come from taxable
income for the very year in question.  Because our income tax
system is on an annual basis, failure to report income must be
charged for a specific year.”  Boulet, 577 F.2d at 1167 (italics
added).   My colleagues mention this “remark[]” in Boulet in
passing, and then dismiss the decision without analysis or
discussion.  See Maj. Op. at 11.  I do not think that proclamation
can be so easily brushed aside given our discussion in Pollen.
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Similarly, although I agree with my colleagues’
statement that the Department of Justice’s internal manuals are
not binding on this (or any other) court, I do not think that we
should so readily ignore the clear logic of their guidance that
alleged evasion of assessment cases “must relate to a specific
year.”  Id. (quoting Tax Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal
Tax Manual § 8.07[2] (2008))   Evasion of assessment cases
often allow the Government to identify the tax deficiency for a
given year down to the penny.  Indeed, that is the case here.
Unlike Pollen, this case does not involve indiscriminate evasion
of payment of any and all taxes.  There was simply no legitimate
reason to conflate the 3 years of evasion of assessment into the
same count here.  
There is, however, substantial danger of prejudice
in joining these 3 years in the same count without any
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safeguards such as jury interrogatories and specific instructions
that were stressed in Shorter.  Thus, despite our holding here, I
hope that the Government will exercise its prosecutorial
discretion more prudently when deciding how to structure future
indictments for evasion of assessment under 26 U.S.C. § 7201.
Indeed, I have no doubt that failure to do so may well warrant
post-verdict relief absent appropriate jury instructions and/or
jury interrogatories as explained in Shorter.  Although the
potential of a verdict that is not unanimous is not realized in this
case because the evidence against Root as to evasion in each
year crammed into Count Two is overwhelming, as discussed
below, the facts of this case reveal the danger inherent in
duplicitous indictments.  
III. This Case is Instructive in Showing the Dangers of
Duplicitous Charges 
15  LISA (Legal Information Services Associates) is a sole proprietorship created by
Root to which he had Merullo and Ford, two Ohio-based attorneys, direct their regular
payments to him.  Supp. App. at 57-59.   
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Paragraph 3(g) of Count Two of Root’s indictment
alleges: 
On or about April 15, 2002,
defendant ROOT filed a false
federal income tax return for the
year 2001 by failing to report
substantial income from RBI,
LISA, various lawyers and law
firms, and [Mike Parker].
Government Exhibit JS-13 lists the “Schedule of Total
Income For New Perspectives and LISA”  and specifies Root’s15














































2003 TOTAL         $62,510.90
TOTAL ALL
YEARS
      $210,893.44
Root was a resident of Ohio during the relevant
time period and filed his tax returns from Ohio.  All of the
entities he was involved with, except Reading Broadcasting Inc
(“RBI”), are situated in Ohio.  RBI is the only entity named in
the indictment that is located in the Eastern District of
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Pennsylvania.  The other income as listed in the indictment and
in the Government’s Exhibit pertains to evasion of assessment
on income earned in Ohio.  As my colleagues note, Root also
argued that venue in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was
not proper.  The district court, at the Government’s request,
instructed the jury that it must find that “some act in furtherance
of the crime charged, took place here in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.”  Supp. App. at 69-70.  
It is apparent from the above Exhibit, that the
income from RBI varies considerably from 2001 to 2002 or
2003.  While Root was charged with receiving over $30,000
from RBI in each of 2002 and 2003, the Government only
charged Root with receiving $5,394.22 from RBI in 2001.  
16 As the majority explains, here, the evidence in support of the total amount of
income on which Root evaded assessment in 2001 was such that there was no reasonable
likelihood that a juror would have acquitted in 2001.
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As the Government notes, juries are presumed to
follow the instructions they are given.  Appellee Br. at 37 (citing
Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 97 (1954)).  Here, the jury
was instructed that in order to convict, it must find that some act
in furtherance of the crime took place in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.  Accordingly, we must presume, at a minimum,
that the jury found that Root evaded assessment of taxes on
some of the income from RBI.  Thus, if the Government had
failed to proffer evidence sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Root evaded assessment of taxes on
income from the other sources – all of which were in Ohio – the
verdict could have been based solely on the income from RBI.16
This very plausible scenario would have raised precisely the
dangers endemic in duplicitous indictments that were discussed
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in Shorter.  Root could stand convicted of evasion of assessment
on his 2001 return for evading assessment of taxes on roughly
$5,400 of income.  Although it is certainly possible that a jury
may conclude that the tax deficiency on that amount of income
is “substantial,” it is also possible that at least one juror would
have a reasonable doubt about the question.  This is especially
true when one considers that corresponding income for 2002 and
2003 is approximately six times greater than the income from
RBI charged for 2001.  The doctrine of duplicity is intended to
“avoid[] the . . . risk that jurors may not have been unanimous
as to any one of the crimes charged . . . .” United States v.
Margiotta, 646 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Maj. Op.
at 14-15 (citing Margiotta, and listing other dangers underlying
the doctrine of duplicity). 
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The Government mentions this very point in
arguing that Root was not prejudiced here even if the indictment
was duplicitous.  The Government states:  
[T]here can be no dispute that the
tax deficiencies caused by Root’s
failure to report the income he
received from the commission
payments were ‘substantial’ with
respect to each of the years at issue.
See Supp. App. 90 (noting that
Root received $5,394.22 in
unreported income from RBI in
2001, $34,794.72 in 2002, and
$37,088.74 in 2003).
 
Appellee’s Br. at 30 n.15.  The Government’s argument
is problematic.  The conclusion that, as a matter of law, the tax
owed on $5,394.22 is “substantial” for the purposes of § 7201,
is untenable.  Since it is an element of the crime, determining
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whether a particular deficiency is “substantial” is a jury question
that cannot be assumed as a matter of law without transgressing
the limitations of the due process clause.  See Gaudin, 515 U.S.
at 510.
My colleagues attempt to support the
Government’s speculative assertion by suggesting that there is
a low threshold of proof for establishing that the amount of a tax
deficiency is substantial.  They refer to amounts that juries have
found and our sister courts of appeals have affirmed as
sufficiently “substantial” to sustain a conviction under § 7201.
See Maj. Op. at 15-16.  The argument is unavailing.  In 2 of the
3 cases, the defendant was convicted for certain years and
acquitted for other years of evasion with which he was charged -
an option that Root would have been denied because of the
duplicity in Count Two.  See Davenport, 824 F.2d at 1515
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(granting the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal for
Counts II and III, “which were tax evasion charges for the years
1981 and 1982” and being convicted on all other counts); see
also Gross, 286 F.2d at 59 (noting that the defendant “was
acquitted on Counts I, IV, V and VI,” representing 4 of the 6
years for which defendant was charged).
Moreover, comparing the inflation-adjusted
amounts found to be substantial in those cases reinforces that a
jury may well have found the amount attributed to RBI in 2001
insufficient had the deficiency on income from RBI been
charged separately.  For example, the $3,358.68 of taxes held to
be substantial evasion for the tax year 1980 in Davenport, is
equivalent to $7,218.72 in 2001, the first year for which Root
17 I have calculated these amounts using the “CPI Inflation Calculator” on the website
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is part of the U.S. Department of Labor.  See
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.  The calculator is described by the BLS as
follows: “The CPI inflation calculator uses the average Consumer Price Index for a given
calendar year. This data represents changes in prices of all goods and services purchased for
consumption by urban households. This index value has been calculated every year since
1913. For the current year, the latest monthly index value is used.”
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpicalc.htm.  To ensure equivalent comparisons, I am comparing the
amounts in the year of the tax deficiency.  One might argue that the year in which the trial
took place is more relevant because it better reflects jurors’ current impressions of buying
power.  However, the dates of trials are not always clear from the facts recited in opinions.
The year of the tax deficiency is an accurate and appropriate basis for the calculation.
18 Id.  Though the distinction may be obvious, it is important to note that the amounts
as presented are not comparable.  While Davenport addresses unpaid tax, Gross is citing to
taxable income on which tax was not paid.  Tax evasion requires a “substantial tax
deficiency,” which is calculated as a proportion of taxable income.
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was charged.   See Maj. Op. at 15-16 (citing Davenport, 82417
F.2d at 1516-17).  Similarly, the unreported income of $2,500 in
Gross, cited as “substantial” by the majority, was for tax years
1954 and 1955.  Id. (citing Gross, 286 F.2d at 60-61).  Income
of $2,500 in 1955 is the equivalent of $16,520.52 in 2001.18
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These concerns are both confirmed and
exacerbated by statements the Assistant United States Attorney
made before the district court.  During the hearing on Root’s
Omnibus Pretrial Motion, the district court expressed
understandable concerns about the propriety of charging
multiple offenses in a single count.  The court inquired into why
various acts of evasion pertaining to Root’s interest in LISA
over multiple years were combined into a single count. The
following exchange ensued:
Court: I’m wondering what it is
with LISA that occurred in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
AUSA: Your Honor, it didn’t have
anything to do with the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania
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The Court: Well, I know that but
yet you’re charging that as part of
Count II.
AUSA: We’re required to under the
venue statute and under the tax
evasion statute.
Court: Why are you required to . .
. couldn’t you just as well indict
him in Ohio for failure to pay
income tax on money he earned
under this Legal Information
Services Associates?
AUSA: No, Your Honor, because
here’s why. We have -- as I said,
the tax evasion statute requires that
we prove a substantial tax
deficiency. So if we had indicted
the case in Ohio we’d still have the
issue of proving the income that he
earned in Pennsylvania and proving
the evasive acts that he took.
19 Given the defendant’s Ohio residence, the fact that his companies were Ohio
companies, and the fact that he derived substantial income through those Ohio companies
from legal work he did in Ohio, it is a mystery why the Government decided to bring this
indictment in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rather than Ohio. However, that is a
mystery that we do not need to solve, and it is one that cannot be solved on this record.
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App. at 533-34.  The exchange then continues with the
AUSA arguing that Root is not contesting venue, and that since
“the indictment charges evasive acts occurred in this district[,]
that’s the end of the inquiry for venue purposes.”  Id.
Although I do not want to unfairly impute a
meaning that was not intended, it is exceedingly difficult to read
that exchange and conclude anything other than that the
Government combined acts over the years in the same count to
aggregate Root’s total tax deficiency and thereby facilitate
proving that it was substantial.   Generally speaking, there is19
certainly nothing wrong with strategically drafting an indictment
in a manner that maximizes the likelihood of conviction or
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facilitates proof.  However, there is something wrong when the
result is a duplicitous indictment that exposes the defendant to
conviction on less than a unanimous verdict.
Nevertheless, this case does not warrant reversal
because, as the majority correctly points out,“[t]he record
demonstrates Root evaded the assessment of more than $50,000
of income in each of the years in question.”  Maj. Op. at 15.
Although the indictment and the jury charge do not
appropriately segregate Root’s conduct by year, “Root’s evasive
conduct was consistent during the three-year time period.”  Id.
Moreover, when Root first filed amended returns in June 2004,
he reported only the commission payments made to New
Perspectives; he did not report the other income.  Accordingly,
no reasonable jury could have voted to acquit Root of evasion
of assessment of tax for any of the years with which he was
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charged in Count Two.  Similarly, the record reflects sufficient
activity in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to establish
venue in that district.
As I noted at the outset, and as the majority
explains, the doctrine of duplicity is intended to “avoid[] the . .
. risk that jurors may not have been unanimous as to any one of
the crimes charged . . . .” Margiotta, 646 F.2d at 733; see also
Maj. Op. at 14-15.  As I have also explained, Shorter teaches
that, absent appropriate jury instructions and/or special
interrogatories that address the risk of conviction on less than a
unanimous verdict as to each year in which evasion of
assessment is charged, trial courts should not permit indictments
(such as this one) that combine offense conduct across multiple
20Although the Government now answers the question of whether Root suffered any
prejudice by stating “there was no conceivable way” that the jury may have concluded Root
only committed tax evasion in some but not all of the years, the risk was sufficiently real to
cause the Government to propose jury instructions to address that concern. 
The Government requested the following as to how the jury should be instructed as
to whether Root attempted to evade or defeat a tax: “The government need only to prove one
act to satisfy this element of the offense, but you must unanimously agree on which act or acts were
committed.”  Gov’t Request No. 38, Proposed Jury Instructions at 60-61 (footnote omitted).
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tax years in a single count.   Ignoring that risk permits20
indictments that rest only “on the narrow basis of tax evasion
law” to escape the more crucial step of “measur[ing] that
indictment against the purposes of prohibition against duplicity”
to ensure fairness.   Shorter, 608 F. Supp. at 879. 
IV. Venue
I agree with the majority that the “Government
bears the burden of proving venue by a preponderance of the
evidence and venue must be proper for each count of the
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indictment.”  Maj. Op. at 18.  I also agree that tax evasion can
be a continuing offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).  Id. at 19.
However, as I believe that it is duplicitous to combine multiple
years of evasion of assessment into Count Two, I am in
dubitante about the majority’s conclusion that venue for Count
Two of the indictment can rest on conduct in any one year.  
  Moreover, the majority’s conclusion that “[t]he
locality of a crime for the purpose of venue extends ‘over the
whole area through which force propelled by an offender
operates’” is troubling.  Id. at 19 (quoting United States v.
Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944)).  The Supreme Court has
held that where 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) applies, for purposes of
venue, a crime is “committed in all of the places that any part of
it took place, and venue . . . [is] appropriate in any of them.”
United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 282 (1999).
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Yet, the Court made clear that it was not deciding whether
“venue may also permissibly be based upon the effect of a
defendant’s conduct in a district other than the one in which the
defendant performs the acts constituting the offense.”  Id. at 279
n.2.  In United States v. Johnson, cited by the majority, the Court
laid out the potential dangers of expanding venue:
By utilizing the doctrine of a continuing
offense, Congress may, to be sure, provide that
the locality of a crime shall extend over the whole
area through which force propelled by an offender
operates. Thus, an illegal use of the mails . . . may
subject the user to prosecution in the district
where he sent the goods, or in the district of their
arrival, or in any intervening district. Plainly
enough, such leeway not only opens the door to
needless hardship to an accused by prosecution
remote from home and from appropriate facilities
for defense. It also leads to the appearance of
abuses, if not to abuses, in the selection of what
may be deemed a tribunal favorable to the
prosecution.  These are matters that touch closely
the fair administration of criminal justice and
public confidence in it, on which it ultimately
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rests. These are important factors in any
consideration of the effective enforcement of the
criminal law. . . . Questions of venue in criminal
cases, therefore, are not merely matters of formal
legal procedure. They raise deep issues of public
policy in the light of which legislation must be
construed. If an enactment of Congress equally
permits the underlying spirit of the constitutional
concern for trial in the vicinage to be respected
rather than to be disrespected, construction should
go in the direction of constitution.
To balance such concerns, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, for example, suggests that “when venue
may properly lie in more than one district under a continuing
offense theory, we should also ask ‘whether the criminal acts in
question bear ‘substantial contacts’ with any given venue.’”
United States v. Ramirez, 420 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2005)
(quoting United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 93 (2d
Cir.2000)).  To determine whether “a chosen venue is unfair or
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prejudicial to a defendant,” a court “takes into account four
main factors: (1) the site of the crime, (2) its elements and
nature, (3) the place where the effect of the criminal conduct
occurs, and (4) suitability of the venue chosen for accurate
factfinding.”  Saavedra, 223 F.3d at 93.
Ultimately, the facts of this case do not require or
support a holding that is as broad as the one implied by the
majority.  Venue is appropriate here because Root evaded
assessment on income from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in each year for which he was charged.
IV. Conclusion
It is important to stress that our judgment
affirming this conviction should not obfuscate the fact that this
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indictment was drawn in a manner that created needless risks of
a verdict that was not unanimous.  Nevertheless, even though
this indictment is clearly duplicitous and could have otherwise
resulted in a denial of due process by depriving Root of the
requirement of jury unanimity, and even though bringing this
prosecution in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is certainly
questionable, I join the judgment affirming the conviction for
the reasons I have explained. 
